Gasgoo Munich-Tesla China recently set an intense tone for the "Golden September" auto market with a promotional announcement: orders placed and vehicles delivered before September 30 qualify for a 5,000 yuan cash incentive on the entire Model 3 lineup and a 10,000 yuan cash incentive on the entire Model Y lineup. Stacked with financial policies like 5-year 0% interest, the Model 3's starting price has touched 222,500 yuan.
This is not a solo performance by Tesla. The Chinese auto market has long been shrouded in smoke; from new EV startups to traditional domestic brands, from joint ventures to luxury camps, a full-spectrum collective price cut is playing out.
According to incomplete statistics, over ten automakers have concentrated car-buying benefits in September—interest subsidies, direct cash cuts, trade-in subsidies, fixed-price strategies... methods vary, but point to the same cruel reality: grabbing volume.
"Golden September" Opening: Price Cuts, Volume Grab, Performance Dash
On September 3, SAIC Audi pulled the trigger first. The A7L limited-time price starts at 262,800 yuan, a direct cut of 155,900 yuan from the guide price of 418,700 yuan; the Q6 limited-time price starts at 279,800 yuan, a direct cut of 187,800 yuan from the guide price of 467,600 yuan. When the price of an Audi large sedan approaches the joint-venture medium SUV segment, the luxury brand's pricing system dips again, and the bottom line is further breached.
Image source: Volvo Cars
Volvo followed closely, with an even more decisive posture. The XC70 99th Anniversary Gratitude Edition Core has an official guide price of 411,900 yuan, but the September limited-time price breaks directly to 229,900 yuan. Stacking the month's limited offer of 15,000 yuan and a trade-in subsidy of 15,000 yuan, the final starting price is pressed to 199,900 yuan—more than 210,000 yuan lower than the original guide price. A large plug-in hybrid SUV finally selling for the price of a joint-venture medium sedan; this discount magnitude has far exceeded the scope of conventional promotions.
Terminal prices for German luxury brands have also lost ground. For example, the BMW 5 Series, with an official guide price of 368,000 to 448,000 yuan, saw the 525 model's installment landing price in the 270,000-plus range according to BMW 4S store sales, after stacking trade-in and local subsidies.
Earlier this year, BMW adjusted suggested retail prices for 31 mainstream models; the 5 Series starting price dropped from 439,900 yuan to 368,000 yuan. Entering August, terminal offers further intensified, with installment base vehicle prices in some regions touching 265,000 yuan.
According to industry insiders, while price cuts drove an increase in inquiries by about 30%, actual transactions did not follow in sync—the sentiment of holding cash and waiting is instead thickening amidst the noise of price cuts.
Image source: Leapmotor
The new EV startup camp is also unwilling to lag behind. Entering September, various brands launched limited-time car-buying benefits: Leapmotor kicked off the "Million Acceleration" Golden Autumn promotion, with the C series enjoying up to 15,680 yuan off, and the B series and Lafa5 up to 19,680 yuan off; ZEEKR 8X offered a 10,000 yuan insurance subsidy, with 20% down and 5-year 0% interest; Xiaomi SU7 and YU7 offered 3-year 0% interest or a 6,000 yuan insurance subsidy, with the SU7 Ultra supporting 5-year 0% interest and a value package of 49,000 yuan; XPENG MONA M03 locks in up to 22,400 yuan in comprehensive benefits with a 5,000 yuan deposit...
Image source: Geely Auto
Joint ventures and domestic brands also did not abstain. Since September, Geely's "Smart Engine Golden Autumn" trade-in subsidy is up to 20,000 yuan, with the Xingrui i-HEV trade-in price as low as 82,700 yuan; AION N60 refreshed price starts at 103,800 yuan, UT 530 CATL version limited-time fixed price at 85,800 yuan; FAW Toyota RAV4 Rongfang cash benefit of 18,000 yuan, stackable with national trade-in subsidies...
Regarding Tesla's official price cut this time, Tesla China stated that since the Model 3 refresh in September 2023 and the Model Y refresh in January 2025, both models are currently at their lowest historical prices across the entire lineup.
A consumer who has been watching the Model Y for a long time stated that while the base vehicle price is indeed the lowest in history after the 10,000 yuan cash incentive, the on-the-road price isn't actually lower than last year due to this year's purchase tax reduction policy.
As for the direct purpose of Tesla's price cut this time, a Tesla salesperson bluntly stated that the cut is mainly to sprint for third-quarter delivery volumes; September is a key window at the end of the quarter. He also revealed that prices are expected to recover in October, making now the best time to buy.
This round of "Golden September" promotions can be described as a collective sprint forced by annual sales targets into a corner. September is both the closing month of the third quarter and the last full window for a volume push for the whole year—if you sit still now, it's equivalent to declaring the annual target a failure in advance.
"Golden September" Shift: A Price War That Must Be Fought
The most direct motivation for price cuts comes from continuously worsening sales data.
According to the "National Passenger Vehicle Market Analysis for August 2026" released by the China Passenger Car Association (CPCA) on September 8, August's national passenger vehicle retail volume was 1.541 million units, a year-on-year decrease of 23.6%. Cumulative retail volume for the first eight months of the year was 11.716 million units, a year-on-year decrease of 20.8%.
It is estimated that the average completion rate of sales targets for mainstream domestic automakers from January to August is just over 50%—with time reaching the final month of the third quarter, more than half the task remains unfinished. Judging by public data from mainstream automakers, ZEEKR leads with a completion rate of 83.7%, having already exceeded full-year progress; NIO is at about 58%, Li Auto about 53%, while XPENG and Xiaomi hover around the 40% mark. The completion rates for independent automakers like Geely and Chery mostly fall between 56% and 60%—none of them are having it easy.
However, "performance pressure" can only explain "why cut prices," but cannot answer "why the cuts are so concentrated." The answer is buried deep in the texture of industry structure—the Chinese auto market is shifting from an incremental market to the deep waters of stock-game competition.
The reason "Golden September, Silver October" was once the golden rule of the auto market is that it was built on the soil of "incremental expansion": demand continued to swell, and each manufacturer could share in the dividends of growth.
But now, that soil has hardened. First-time purchase demand is tending toward saturation, with replacement and additional purchases becoming the main engines; the market has lost the explosive incremental growth needed to digest the massive capacity released by various enterprises. At this stage, one automaker's sales growth almost inevitably means another's share loss—the market is no longer a positive-sum game, but a cruel zero-sum battle.
Image source: Huaban
In addition, the chain reaction brought by the new energy penetration rate breaking through a "tipping point" is further pushing this process to a climax. According to CPCA data, in August 2026, the retail penetration rate of new energy passenger vehicles reached 65.2%—for every three new cars sold, nearly two are new energy vehicles. August retail volume for internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles was about 540,000 units, a plunge of over 40% year-on-year, with the penetration rate falling below 35%.
This structural change directly impacts the living space of ICE vehicles. When market share is compressed to about one-third, the economies of scale crumble, fixed costs per vehicle rise sharply, and significant price cuts to clear inventory become a helpless move for ICE automakers.
Cui Dongshu, secretary-general of the CPCA branch, pointed out in an interview that current market price cuts show characteristics of "deep diving by ICE vehicles and structural differentiation by new energy vehicles." The average discount for ICE vehicles reached 14.9%, with some older joint venture models exceeding 20%; for new energy vehicles, the average price cut for models discounted from January to June was 30,000 yuan, a drop of about 12%. In the first five months of 2026, the average discount for ICE vehicles climbed to 33,000 yuan, compared to just 17,000 yuan in the same period of 2025—the scale of discounts has nearly doubled.
Meanwhile, the offensive by new energy vehicles is still escalating. In the first half of 2026, sales of new energy models in the 300,000 to 500,000 yuan price range grew by over 120% year-on-year, directly cannibalizing the core customer base of luxury brands like BBA.
Image source: BMW China
BMW Group delivered only 261,800 units in the Chinese market in the first half of 2026, a plunge of 20.4% year-on-year. Volkswagen Group's joint venture sales in China in the first half were 856,000 units, a slide of 31.1% year-on-year. Volkswagen Group Chief Financial Officer Arno Antlitz admitted that the company's current operating profit margin is only 3.8%—"this figure is still on the low side," making the severity of the reality self-evident.
Deeper pressure comes from the narrowing dimension of technological competition. In the first half, automakers could still build moats through technological differences in intelligence and battery systems. But as technology gradually matures, the technological barriers between top players are thinning, and product homogenization is intensifying—price has become the most direct, and most helpless, competitive weapon.
As Cui Dongshu put it, this is not a strategic promotion, but the pain of the industry moving from a "hundred flowers blooming" stage to an "elimination round" stage. He describes this state as "hemorrhaging" competition—amid the two-way squeeze of cost and price, the industry is experiencing a systemic loss of blood.
"Golden September" Magnifying Glass: Who Pays for the Price War?
The shockwaves of the price war are far from stopping at the price tags of the new car market. They are transmitting layer by layer down the industrial chain, from dealers to the used car market, and then to the profit structure of the entire industry—from upstream to downstream, every link needs to rethink its way of survival.
The most direct recipients of the shock are the dealer networks. Xiao Zhengsan, president of the China Automobile Dealers Association (CADA), disclosed at the 2026 China Automobile Dealers Conference that the profitability of the auto circulation industry has narrowed to 23.5%, while the loss surface has reached as high as 55.7%.
The "2025 National Automobile Dealer Survival Status Survey Report" released by CADA shows that 82% of dealers experience price inversion, with 51.6% seeing an inversion magnitude exceeding 15%. In the second half of last year, the average loss surface of national automobile dealers exceeded 50%, and the 4S dealership network saw a net decrease of about 500 stores for the whole year, marking negative growth for the second consecutive year.
Image source: BMW China
Micro-level cases are even more shocking. According to related news, a BMW 7 Series with a purchase price of 700,000 yuan can be transacted for just over 600,000 yuan after stacking various subsidies and rebates, with losses on popular large-sized single vehicles breaking 50,000 yuan. The gross margin on new car sales has fallen to -25.5%, with an average loss of 20,000 to 30,000 yuan per vehicle. Among listed auto dealer groups, six out of seven have fallen into loss. A dealer head described the industry's plight thus: "Selling cars used to be the source of profit; now it is the source of loss."
According to data released by Cui Dongshu, secretary-general of the CPCA branch, on August 27, the auto industry's profit rate further dropped to 3.6% in the first seven months of 2026. During the same period, auto industry revenue was 6.078 trillion yuan, up 2.7% year-on-year; costs were 5.4058 trillion yuan, up 3.8%; and profits were 216.2 billion yuan, down 20%.
Compared to the average profit rate of 6.5% for downstream industrial enterprises, the auto industry remains significantly lower.
The storm of new car price cuts has also swept into the used car market. Official new car price cuts have severely impacted the reference price system of used cars. CADA data shows that from January to July 2026, the cumulative transaction volume of used cars nationwide was 11.2748 million units, a year-on-year increase of 0.39%, an increase of only 43,800 units compared to the same period last year. The cumulative transaction amount was 743 billion yuan. The slight increase in volume coupled with weak growth in amount means the average unit price continues to decline.
Image source: Huaban
In July alone, the national used car market transaction volume was 1.5616 million units, down 3.51% month-on-month and down 5.98% year-on-year, with a transaction amount of 104.47 billion yuan. The decline widened further compared to the first half, indicating that the impact of new car price cuts on the used car market is accelerating.
Additionally, the Used Car Manager Index released by CADA for August showed that 21.7% of managers believed sales prices were "falling," while 24.6% of managers believed their own operating conditions were at a "poor" level.
New car price cuts have caused used car transaction prices to continue falling, and inventory turnover pressure has also intensified. The Used Car Manager Index released by CADA shows that the proportion of managers who believe inventory turnover time is "increasing" was 24.3% in August and as high as 32.6% in July. Amidst slowing turnover, inventory backlog, capital occupation, and vehicle depreciation are becoming a common dilemma for the entire industry.
The slump in the used car market is conversely suppressing new car demand. As old cars fail to fetch good prices, consumers' willingness and ability to replace them drop simultaneously. A complete negative cycle has formed: new car price cuts → used car devaluation → reduced willingness to replace → further shrinking of new car demand.
Looking at full industry profits, the bleeding continues. In the short term, consumers are indeed the biggest beneficiaries of this price war. But taking a longer view, excessively low profit margins will eventually compress the room for investment in R&D, technology, and service. The industry faces a deep dilemma that cannot be avoided: without price cuts, there is no present; with excessive price cuts, there may be no future.
Where is the endpoint of this price-cutting wave?
In the short term, September remains an important window for car buying. Limited-time offers from many automakers expire on September 30—the last day of the third quarter. Whether some automakers will further increase incentives in the final two weeks remains to be seen.
In the medium term, the intensity of the price war may gradually converge. Cui Dongshu judges that the trend of market price declines will significantly converge in the second half of the year and will not continue the comprehensive, massive price cuts of the first half. When the pressure of the third-quarter volume sprint passes, the industry may shift from "indiscriminate price slaughter" to "value competition based on technological differentiation."
At the same time, Cui Dongshu also pointed out that it is difficult for automakers to form a unified price tacit understanding in the second half of the year. Continued "hemorrhaging" will force two major changes: first, cost reconstruction—automakers will cut homogenized, low-efficiency models and promote deep self-research of parts and centralized procurement; second, competition stratification—low-end models will offer small concessions to clear inventory, mid-end models will focus on value and configuration, and high-end models will maintain brand premiums.
But a more fundamental question lies before everyone: when the price war reaches diminishing returns and becomes unsustainable, what will the industry rely on to escape its plight? Under the dual pressure of continuously sliding sales and narrowing profits, brands lacking economies of scale and technological competitiveness will accelerate their exit.
Industry predictions suggest that by 2030, only a minority of NEV automakers may be able to break even. The core of future competition will shift from expansion speed to operational precision—an enterprise's systemic capability, cost control capability, and risk resistance capability will become the keys to deciding life and death.
Conclusion:
The price war will eventually subside. But this round of price cuts has further exacerbated the industry's profit crisis—widespread dealer losses, the reshaping of used car valuation systems, and industry profit rates falling to historical lows; these existing trends are gradually solidifying into industry norms under the repeated scouring of the price war.
What is more worth warning against is: when the industry becomes accustomed to using price to solve problems, can technology, brand, and service—the true moats—still receive sufficient attention?
