Gasgoo Munich-As the embodied AI wave builds, the automobile—viewed as a natural wheeled intelligent carrier—is seen as the ideal springboard for entering the flying car and humanoid robot arenas. Automakers are making cross-sector moves one after another, and capital market enthusiasm is running high.
However, Dong Yang—chairman of the China Industrial Alliance of Power Batteries, co-chairman of the China Automotive Chip Industry Innovation Strategic Alliance, and vice chairman of the China EV 100—recently argued otherwise. "While automakers certainly possess the advantages needed to develop embodied intelligence businesses like flying cars and robots, these are merely necessary conditions, not sufficient ones," he wrote. "Chinese automakers should still exercise caution when entering the flying car and intelligent robot sectors." His remarks cut straight to the underlying concerns behind the industry fervor.
Main Business Foundations Are Shaky; Resources Too Thin for Full-Scale Diversification
Chinese automakers have achieved leapfrog development in new energy and intelligent technologies, with some scaling the global ranks in size and capability. Yet Dong believes visible weaknesses remain beneath the surface of this industrial prosperity. "Chinese automakers should currently focus on the automotive sector," he argued. "Our strength is not yet sufficient; we still have shortcomings in basic and generic technology research, and profit margins are low. We simply do not have the abundant human, material, and financial resources required to explore adjacent sectors."
The industrial reality is that Chinese automakers' overall profit margins are slim, with long-term capital and talent reserves insufficient to sustain a multi-front war. The core automotive track still has major gaps to fill: underlying technologies such as automotive operating systems, autonomous driving chips, core sensors, and high-end manufacturing equipment remain dependent on external sources, while investment in basic research is lacking and generic technology platforms are weak. Scattering limited resources across new fields like flying cars and robots risks diluting the intensity needed to tackle these core challenges, potentially undermining the building of core competitiveness.

Image source: Huaban.com
More critically, the automotive industry has developed over decades into the sector with the world's most complete supply chain, manufacturing system, and market channels—these are the automakers' most core assets. While flying cars and robots share technological roots with automobiles, they differ massively in airworthiness standards, safety regulations, application scenarios, and industrial chain support. The automotive ecosystem cannot be directly transplanted.
Dong emphasized: "With the same amount of energy, filling our shortcomings in the automotive sector is far more important than exploring new tracks." Blindly diversifying before achieving absolute dominance in the core business is tantamount to putting the cart before the horse. It risks failing to gain a foothold in new sectors while simultaneously missing the window for deepening and upgrading the core business.
From a business logic perspective, automakers' R&D, production capacity, and channels are all built around the automobile. A rash move into new territories requires a comprehensive reconstruction of capabilities, carrying a prohibitively high cost of trial and error. Rather than high-risk exploration in unfamiliar fields, it is better to concentrate resources on deepening expertise in electrification, intelligence, and globalization—consolidating and expanding existing advantages. This is the more stable and efficient strategic choice at present.
New Tracks Are Still in Early Stages; Market and Ecosystem Maturity Lag Far Behind Autos
Flying cars and humanoid robots are viewed as the next frontier of future industry, but Dong offers a sobering assessment: "For other tracks in the embodied intelligence field, the conditions for marketization and industrial development are far inferior to those in the automotive sector."
This disparity is evident across multiple dimensions: market size, profit cycles, regulations, and ecosystem maturity.
In terms of market and profitability, the automotive sector is a mature market worth trillions, characterized by stable demand and clear return cycles. By contrast, flying cars and humanoid robots are still in the early stages of industrialization, with minuscule market scales and unclear commercialization paths. "The near-term market space for flying cars and robots—especially humanoid robots—is far smaller than that of the automotive sector, making it difficult to achieve profitability in the short term." Currently, flying cars are confined to niche scenarios like emergency rescue and high-end business travel, while civilian adoption is constrained by policy, cost, safety, and infrastructure. Humanoid robots remain largely in the laboratory and pilot phases, with technological maturity, cost levels, and scenario compatibility yet to meet the conditions for large-scale commercial use.
Short-term fervor in capital markets cannot substitute for the laws of industrial development. The automotive industry is long-cycle, capital-intensive, and heavily regulated; it must follow a gradual path of technological maturation, supply chain perfection, and market cultivation. Blindly diversifying to cater to capital market sentiment—while ignoring objective industrial realities—risks falling into a trap of high investment, low returns, and prolonged losses.
Even more formidable are the regulatory and ecosystem barriers. Flying cars require systemic breakthroughs in policy and infrastructure—such as opening low-altitude airspace, establishing airworthiness standards, building takeoff and landing facilities, and managing air traffic—involving coordination across multiple government departments. Dong believes "these are not conditions that can be met in the short term, or even the medium term." Humanoid robots, meanwhile, face a series of challenges including safety standards, ethical norms, scenario implementation, and core component support; the industrial chain is far from mature. Entering such immature sectors means assuming enormous policy, technological, and market risks.
Dong is not dismissing the value of diversification, but rather opposing reckless advancement. He suggests: "Qualified automakers can engage in strategic cooperation with leading companies in other embodied intelligence sectors." Automakers can leverage their advantages in manufacturing, supply chains, and intelligent technologies to participate in new tracks through partnerships. This approach reduces the risks associated with full-scale diversification while still allowing them to share in the technological and market dividends.
In an era of technological convergence and blurring industrial boundaries, rationality matters more than passion. For Chinese automakers, the pragmatic path to navigating cycles and achieving sustainable growth is clear: first, deepen and perfect the core automotive business, shore up weaknesses, and strengthen foundations—only then should they cautiously seek opportunities to expand into new territories.








