Gasgoo Munich- In global markets, the autonomous driving spotlight has long been fixed on Waymo and Tesla. Yet beyond San Francisco and Austin, another force is quietly seizing the strategic high ground of the global Robotaxi market.
Since the start of 2025, Chinese Robotaxi leaders—represented by Baidu Apollo Go, WeRide, and Pony.ai—have moved beyond domestic tech validation. They are planting their flags across the deserts of the Middle East, the historic cities of Europe, and the major metropolises of Southeast Asia.
Against this backdrop, the narrative of global autonomous driving is being rewritten.
Chinese Robotaxi Firms Accelerate Global Push
WeRide recently signed a strategic partnership agreement with Geely's Farizon New Energy Commercial Vehicle Group, unveiling the upgraded, mass-production-ready Robotaxi GXR.
WeRide plans to deliver 2,000 GXR units in 2026, deploying them across domestic and international markets. That would push its global active fleet past 2,600 vehicles—doubling its 2025 count.
Image source: WeRide
WeRide is already conducting autonomous driving R&D, testing, and operations in more than 40 cities across 11 countries. Its footprint includes fully unmanned commercial operations with Uber in Abu Dhabi and regular public services in Dubai and Riyadh. In Singapore, it has teamed up with Grab to test its Ai.R fleet, while in Ras Al Khaimah, it has partnered with the RAK Transport Authority to launch trial operations for the GXR and Robobus.
Building on this foundation, WeRide founder and CEO Han Xu pledged to accelerate the commercial rollout of the GXR across China, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Europe.
In the Middle East, WeRide will launch fully unmanned operations in Dubai later this month. Come April, its GXR trial operations in Singapore will open to the public.
WeRide is not alone. Baidu Apollo Go and Pony.ai have been aggressively expanding their international footprints.
Recently, Baidu Apollo Go and Uber announced plans to launch fully unmanned ride-hailing services in Dubai in the first quarter of 2026.
Prior to that, Apollo Go partnered with UAE-based AutoGo in January to launch public, fully unmanned commercial operations in Abu Dhabi. The company also confirmed plans to extend its global ecosystem to Europe. It aims to kick off unmanned testing and services in London by 2026 through deep collaborations with Uber and Lyft.
Pony.ai, meanwhile, is focusing its current international strategy on the Middle East and Asia.
In the Middle East, Pony.ai has conducted road tests in Abu Dhabi, Doha, and Dubai. In Asia, it is prioritizing Singapore and South Korea.
The company is also pushing into Europe. In July 2025, it partnered with Luxembourg-based transport company Emile Weber to begin on-road testing.
By the end of 2025, Pony.ai's fleet had grown to 1,159 vehicles—slightly edging out WeRide.
Taken together, the moves of these players reveal a clear blueprint for expansion.
The Middle East—particularly Dubai and Abu Dhabi—has become a key battleground. All three top players are present, and their activity is intensifying. WeRide alone has deployed over 200 vehicles in the region, accounting for roughly one-fifth of its global fleet, underscoring the area's strategic importance.
In Europe, where regulations are conservative and fragmented, Chinese firms are adopting a strategy of "multi-point penetration." They are breaking into markets one by one—Switzerland, France, Luxembourg, Belgium, and Spain—to build a broader presence.
Southeast Asia presents a different dynamic. While the ride-hailing market is massive, low labor costs reduce the immediate economic incentive for Robotaxi adoption. As a result, only Singapore has emerged as a core stronghold, hosting partnerships like Pony.ai with ComfortDelGro and WeRide with Grab.
Their expansion strategies are strikingly similar: all three are forging deep alliances with global ride-hailing platforms like Uber and Lyft. Pony.ai has even brought Uber and Bolt on as shareholders, while each company seeks out "local partners" in specific regions.
Image source: Apollo Go
For instance, Apollo Go has partnered with AutoGo in Abu Dhabi and Swiss Post's PostBus in Switzerland. Pony.ai has teamed up with ComfortDelGro in Singapore, Qatar Transport in Doha, and Emile Weber in Luxembourg.
This approach—combining global alliances with regional customization—follows a clear logic. The first barrier for Chinese firms abroad is rarely technology; it is policy, trust, and the "last mile" of local operations. By partnering with local giants or government agencies, they secure a powerful guide.
Building a brand and user base from scratch is expensive; partnerships offer a fast track. Moreover, overseas operations are far more complex than domestic ones. Vehicle maintenance, charging networks, and right-of-way coordination can all become stumbling blocks—areas where local partners hold a distinct advantage.
On a deeper level, shifts in politics, economics, or culture can pose risks. Deeply integrated partnerships act as multiple "seatbelts," securing the company against turbulence.
Regarding recent Middle East tensions, analysts at Gasgoo Auto Research Institute note a key factor. Most Chinese firms export technology or operate fleets rather than selling hardware. Their data-driven, asset-light models allow them to continue remote training and algorithm optimization even if operations pause.
In this sense, the Chinese Robotaxi expansion is not a solitary expedition, but a strategic game of leverage and alliance.
Internal and External Forces Drive the Push
Since 2025, Chinese Robotaxi firms have moved abroad in unison. Is this blind trend-following, or a calculated breakout?
On the surface, it looks like Apollo Go, WeRide, and Pony.ai are all reaching for the Middle East, Europe, and Southeast Asia. But the deeper driver lies in the momentum built by China's Robotaxi sector over the past decade.
Tracing the start to late 2015, the industry has now completed a decade. That was when Baidu first achieved full autonomous driving on mixed city and highway conditions. In those ten years, Chinese Robotaxi firms have evolved from followers into central players on the global stage.
The data is telling. By the end of October 2025, Apollo Go's global autonomous driving mileage had surpassed 240 million kilometers, with over 17 million orders across 22 cities. Pony.ai and WeRide, each operating fleets of over 1,000 vehicles, have logged tens of millions of kilometers in real-world testing, amassing significant operational experience.
These figures reflect deep R&D accumulation and extensive experience in large-scale commercial operations—giving domestic Robotaxi firms a solid foundation for replication overseas.
More importantly, these deployments are already generating real returns.
Image source: Pony.ai
Data from Pony.ai shows its seventh-generation Robotaxi achieved positive monthly operating profit per vehicle in Shenzhen this February. Daily average net income per vehicle hit 338 yuan, with 23 orders per day.
This is a telling signal: The commercial loop for Robotaxi may not require technology to be flawless. It only needs to reach a tipping point of "good enough" to start generating returns.
WeRide's Robotaxi revenue reached 35.3 million yuan in the third quarter of 2025, a 761% year-on-year surge. Notably, its Middle East subsidiary achieved operating profitability last year.
This proves that the profitability of the Chinese model holds up not just at home, but also in overseas markets where unit prices are higher.
Underpinning this commercial logic is China's comprehensive supply chain advantage in the Robotaxi sector.
From algorithms and hardware to controllers and chassis, China possesses the world's most complete Robotaxi supply chain. This allows for rapid conversion of technology into mass production and creates significant cost advantages through fast iteration—making widespread global deployment feasible.
If the domestic supply chain provides the "push," then the "pull" from overseas markets is equally significant.
The Middle East, in particular, has become the most powerful magnet.
Three layers of logic explain this. First, the region has strong purchasing power and a high acceptance of new technologies, offering a greater tolerance for Robotaxi services.
Second, the region's deep pockets allow cities like Abu Dhabi to tackle two challenges at once. They can import global talent to fill technical gaps and build world-class infrastructure. Middle Eastern capital has invested heavily in Chinese autonomous driving firms for years. Backers of Pony.ai and WeRide include regional funds.
Third, strategic resolve at the national level provides a crucial safety net for Chinese entrants.
Dubai's "Smart Mobility 2030" strategy mandates that 25% of trips be autonomous by 2030, rising to 36% by 2040. Saudi Arabia has set targets for 2030: 25% of freight transport and 15% of public transit to be autonomous.
Notably, following recent regional turmoil, the Dubai government has actually accelerated its push for fully unmanned operations. WeRide has reached an agreement with the Dubai Roads and Transport Authority (RTA) to launch such services soon.
Navigating Undercurrents to Advance
In this age of exploration, opportunity beckons—but waves are surging in the dark.
The sudden shift in the Middle East served as a stark reality check for the industry.
In early March, Apollo Go, WeRide, Pony.ai, and Neolix all suspended operations in the UAE to varying degrees due to regional tensions. While most resumed quickly—WeRide even maintained normal commercial operations in Abu Dhabi and Riyadh—the episode exposed the potential impact of geopolitical risks on overseas business.
Image source: WeRide (taken early March 2026)
Analysts at Gasgoo Auto Research Institute note a critical risk. Autonomous driving relies heavily on high-definition maps, 5G networks, and roadside infrastructure. This makes the risk of business interruption during conflict immediate.
If geopolitical risk is a "black swan," then policy and regulatory barriers are the even harder-to-predict "gray rhino."
Europe's regulatory maze is a prime example. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) imposes strict rules on data collection and storage. Meanwhile, labor protections and union resistance create non-market barriers that are often higher than the technical hurdles.
Wang Xianjin, a CPPCC member and vice president of the China Academy of Transportation Sciences, notes a challenge. Chinese firms often face repeated testing, long licensing cycles, and high compliance costs. Gaining fair market access and a seat at the rule-making table remains a severe challenge.
Then there is the United States, which has effectively closed its doors to Chinese autonomous driving.
In January 2025, the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued a final rule. It banned the import and sale of connected vehicle (VCS) software and hardware. It also banned autonomous driving systems (ADS) software with significant links to China or Russia.
This means any Robotaxi relying on Chinese core algorithms or hardware will likely be barred from commercial sale or operation in the U.S.
When competition is politicized, commercial logic falls by the wayside. This confirms a broader view: The Robotaxi race is no longer just a technological sprint between companies, but an extension of great-power rivalry.
External competitive pressure is equally formidable.
Waymo, the global pioneer, is already operating commercially in Phoenix, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. It plans to expand to at least 20 more cities this year, including Tokyo and London.
A greater threat may come from Tesla. While it currently has only about 400 Robotaxis deployed, it is accelerating Cybercab trial production, with mass production slated to begin next month. That will inevitably speed up its deployment rate.
Image source: Tesla
Moreover, Dongwu Securities suggests that if Tesla's FSD achieves Level 4 capability, the company could theoretically deploy millions of Robotaxis overnight. The disruptive potential lies in its "owner network" concept, which would allow private owners to add their idle vehicles to the network.
Notably, Tesla's autonomous driving technology recently completed road testing in Abu Dhabi.
This means that even without entering the U.S. market, Chinese firms are destined for a head-on collision with Waymo and Tesla on the global stage.
The immaturity of the business model also warrants caution.
Chinese firms' deep reliance on Uber and Lyft risks relegating them to mere "tech suppliers" in the long run. If users only recognize the platform brand—Uber, for instance—while forgetting the technology provider behind it, the brand equity of Chinese companies will inevitably suffer.
Striking a balance between leveraging local partners and building their own brand identity is a challenge Chinese firms must address.
To address these challenges, Wang Xianjin recommends several measures. First, establish a special category for autonomous vehicle exports. This encourages "vehicle plus full-stack tech" solutions. Second, promote mutual recognition of regulations and test results. Priority regions include Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Singapore, Vietnam, and Thailand. Third, support leading firms in forming a "China ICV Export Alliance." This integrates autonomous driving into the "Digital Silk Road" and "Green Smart Mobility" initiatives.
Implementing these recommendations will take time, but there is no denying that Chinese Robotaxi firms have secured a foothold in the global market, and their influence is growing.
Apollo Go and Uber have plans to deploy thousands of autonomous vehicles across multiple markets, with Dubai alone set to exceed 1,000 units. Apollo Go has also partnered with Lyft to launch its sixth-generation vehicles in Germany and the UK in 2026, with plans to scale up to thousands across Europe.
WeRide plans to increase its Middle East deployment to between 500 and 1,000 vehicles this year, scaling into the thousands over the next few years. By 2030, it aims to deploy tens of thousands of Robotaxis globally.
Additionally, Momenta has partnered with Uber, planning to deploy its first batch of robotaxis in Europe in early 2026.
This implies that the scale of Chinese Robotaxi deployment overseas is poised to reach a new level, with this year shaping up to be a critical breakout period.
Conclusion
From the expansion of 2025 to the stress tests of early 2026 and the projected global explosion by 2030, Chinese Robotaxi firms are carving out their own path to globalization.
The road ahead will hardly be smooth: geopolitical undercurrents, regulatory walls, and pressure from giants all pose severe tests. Yet the direction is clear. Driven by technological momentum and overseas demand, the Chinese Robotaxi model is leaving an indelible mark on the global map.
