In 2025, Li Auto endured a distinct bout of "growing pains." Full-year deliveries stalled at 406,000 units—meeting just 64% of its revised annual target and marking an 18.8% year-on-year decline.
It was also a pivotal year when the company shifted its learning focus from Huawei to Toyota.
Looking back, Li Auto launched two distinct "learning expeditions" starting in 2022. First, it took Huawei as a mentor, adopting the IPD process and a matrix organization to crack the code of scaling. Then, in the second half of 2025, it turned its gaze toward Toyota.
As the fastest startup to reach 1 million deliveries, Li Auto's benchmarking strategy initially paid off handsomely. Sales surged through 2023 and 2024, with deliveries topping 500,000 units in 2024. It became the first to achieve consistent profitability, completing a preliminary transition from "founder-driven" to "system-driven" operations.
Yet the sales volatility and organizational shifts of 2025 raised a fundamental question: as the NEV industry shifts from growth to a zero-sum game, benchmarking provides a ladder for growth, but it is not the ultimate answer.
Today, structural differentiation in the NEV market is intensifying. The 400,000-unit mark has become a clear watershed for startups. The logic of competition has shifted from "who sells the most" to "who can deliver high-quality volume consistently."
For Li Auto, the challenge after absorbing Huawei's organizational strength and adopting Toyota-like traits is how to integrate these lessons, anchor its own DNA, and ultimately "be itself." This is not only the core task for navigating industry cycles but also provides a critical blueprint for other startups.
From Learning Huawei to Showing Toyota Traits
The growth of startup automakers is essentially a process of finding direction through trial and error and plugging gaps by borrowing from others. Li Auto's phased approach to learning from Huawei and Toyota was not blind trend-following but a pragmatic choice matched to its developmental needs at each stage—every step landing on a critical juncture of industry competition.
In 2022, Li Auto stood at a critical crossroads of "going from 1 to N." At that time, the Li Auto ONE had completed the "0 to 1" survival validation with its precise positioning for family users, and the L9 launch had shown early promise. Yet the growth model relying on a single hit product was showing bottlenecks.
More critically, the competitive landscape was shifting dramatically. The Huawei-powered AITO M7 launched in 2022, hitting Li Auto's core user base with a similar price range and selling points of "intelligence plus spaciousness."
Li Xiang once wrote on Weibo that the launch and execution of the AITO M7 in the third quarter of 2022 effectively "crippled" the Li Auto ONE. The result was a sales collapse and early discontinuation, a loss of over 1 billion yuan in a single quarter, and the departure of numerous frontline product experts.
At this point, Li Auto urgently needed to convert founder Li Xiang's personal product acumen into a replicable systemic capability. As a benchmark for scaled operations in the tech sector, Huawei's IPD (Integrated Product Development) process, matrix organizational structure, and PBC (Personal Business Commitment) performance model fit Li Auto's core needs perfectly.
Li Auto knew well that to leap from a "single-hit automaker" to a "multi-product line scaled automaker," it had to bridge the gap in its systemic capabilities.
Image Source: Li Auto's Weibo
According to Li Xiang, Li Auto began comprehensively studying Huawei in late September 2022, moving quickly to upgrade to a matrix organization. "Our management team bought public books on Huawei—no one bought fewer than ten," he noted. Through this study, they discovered that the problems Li Auto faced in product R&D, sales service, supply chain manufacturing, and organizational finance had been solved by Huawei over a decade ago.
In terms of offensive operations, Li Auto learned from the German premium trio (BBA). This covered how to run 4S dealerships, select locations, and operate in cities like Shanghai and Beijing that do not offer free license plates for new energy vehicles, as well as how to optimize every detail of the sales conversion process.
Li Xiang stated that through this learning, the company reduced customer acquisition costs to one-fifth of that for mall stores, while sales in Shanghai and Beijing continued to rise. The nationwide visitor conversion rate tripled, and per-capita sales reached 11 units per month. Meanwhile, Li Auto adjusted its product decision-making. Knowing it "couldn't beat" the AITO M7, Li Auto discontinued the Li Auto ONE early, paying 1 billion yuan in compensation to suppliers. Simultaneously, it launched and delivered the Li Auto L8 two months ahead of schedule.
Li Xiang viewed this as a real-world application of the matrix model covering product R&D, sales service, and supply chain manufacturing. The company optimized the IPD process to address the unique cycle of smart EVs. Before this, Li Auto had not even established an EOP (End of Production) process. By early June 2023, the Li Auto ONE, its first model, was completely sold out.
Judging by Li Auto's 2023 performance, the results of this learning were evident. Sales broke 20,000 units for several consecutive months, and cumulative sales for the first five months of 2023 topped 100,000 units, giving it an insurmountable lead among startups. By comparison, NIO and XPENG only sold around 6,000 units each in May of that year.
Li Auto's rise transformed the startup landscape from a "top five" rivalry to a situation of "single-player dominance."
Sustained sales growth significantly improved Li Auto's performance, leading to positive profits in the first quarter of 2023. During the period, revenue reached 18.79 billion yuan, up 96.5% year-on-year, while net profit hit 934 million yuan—turning positive for the first time.
At that time, Li Auto became only the third new energy brand to achieve profitability, following Tesla and BYD.
More importantly, the successful launch of multiple L-series models created a product matrix covering the 300,000 to 500,000 yuan price range. This completed the preliminary transition from "founder-driven" to "system-driven" operations, laying a solid foundation for subsequent scale expansion.
However, it is worth noting that regarding Li Auto's comprehensive study of Huawei, Yang Xueliang, Senior Vice President of Geely Holding, commented at the time: "Loving to learn is a good thing, but grasping the essence is difficult. Huawei is a product of its era, but the era has changed."
That observation was not off the mark. As Li Auto scaled, Huawei-style process-driven management gradually exposed issues of adaptability to the automotive industry's attributes.
In 2025, Li Auto faced its first sales Waterloo, with full-year deliveries falling 18.8% year-on-year. The core crux lay in the multi-product line push: decision cycles lengthened, internal friction over resources intensified, pure electric product progress fell short of expectations, and synergy efficiency across the three product lines was low.
This predicament made Li Auto acutely aware that the automotive industry, being heavy-asset and long-cycle, differs fundamentally from the rapid iteration of the tech sector. Simply copying a tech company's process model cannot handle the challenges of refined operations after scaling.
At this juncture, Toyota, a benchmark automaker with a century of history, pointed the way. Its product development model centered on the CE (Chief Engineer) system, along with its lean production philosophy and cost planning capabilities, became a key direction for Li Auto to solve its current problems.
Image Source: Li Auto's Weibo
Regarding whether Li Auto is adjusting its organizational system and learning from Toyota, Gasgoo Auto consulted a company executive. As of press time, no direct response had been received.
What is obvious, however, is that Li Auto has adjusted its product lines. In early 2026, the head of the second product line resigned, and Li Auto immediately announced the merger of the first and second product lines, placing them under the unified management of the original first product line.
Against this backdrop, some believe Li Auto is not simply "de-Huaweiizing" but is shifting its learning focus toward systems closer to the origins of the automotive industry, particularly Toyota, during this phase of adjustment. This judgment is not groundless: from product line integration and the concentration of decision-making power to a renewed emphasis on manufacturing and product planning capabilities, Li Auto's changes do exhibit characteristics similar to Toyota's system on certain levels.
Regarding Li Auto's study of Huawei and Toyota, an industry practitioner told Gasgoo Auto: "Judging by industry development laws, Li Auto's phased benchmarking model perfectly fits the startup growth path of '0 to 1,' '1 to N,' and then 'N to quality.' It is a very pragmatic choice."
The person believes that while startups rely on single-point breakthroughs to complete the '0 to 1' survival validation, entering the scale expansion phase requires solving the problem of insufficient system capability. Huawei's IPD process and matrix organization helped Li Auto convert the founder's personal product ability into replicable organizational ability, which was also the core reason for Li Auto's soaring sales and stable profitability in 2023-2024.
However, they also emphasized that when a company reaches a certain scale, issues like process redundancy and increased internal friction naturally surface. If Li Auto turns to Toyota now to learn lean production and the CE system, it is an inevitable choice to plug the gaps in manufacturing and refined operations.
Defining the Boundaries of Borrowing: "Learning from Benchmarks" Cannot Replace "Being Yourself"
Yet it is undeniable that throughout its benchmarking journey, Li Auto has both gained growth and encountered "acclimatization issues."
This reflects a common law of the industry: any benchmark system is rooted in its own corporate DNA and industry attributes. Blindly copying it inevitably leads to the trap of "learning the form but not the spirit."
Today, as homogenization in the new energy vehicle sector intensifies, "learning from benchmarks" can only solve standardization problems; it cannot build differentiated competitiveness. "Being yourself" is the core of long-term corporate development.
Huawei's IPD system stems from the rapid iteration of the tech industry, prioritizing efficiency and standardization. Toyota's CE system is rooted in a century of accumulated talent pipelines, a stable market structure, and deep manufacturing heritage. While both have advantages, neither can fully adapt to Li Auto's unique gene as a "startup with a family-user positioning"—a gap that gradually became apparent as the company scaled.
The "acclimatization" of the Huawei model first manifested in the weakening of organizational flexibility.
Although the PBC performance model introduced by Li Auto improved execution, its high-pressure assessment logic conflicted with the innovation culture that startups rely on for survival. To meet performance metrics, marketing departments frequently demanded that product departments adjust configurations, disrupting the R&D rhythm of certain models. Meanwhile, R&D departments, overly focused on short-term performance targets, reduced investment in long-term technological innovation.
This contradiction eventually forced Li Auto to restart OKRs (Objectives and Key Results) in 2025 to find a balance between being results-oriented and maintaining innovative flexibility.
Replicating the Toyota model faces similar difficulties. Toyota's CE system appears to be a "single-person-in-charge" system, but in reality, it relies on a mature talent training mechanism. Gasgoo Auto learned from industry insiders that a Toyota CE must rotate through R&D, production, supply chain, and other departments for many years to acquire full-process decision-making capabilities.
The "Toyota-like" characteristics Li Auto currently exhibits are more akin to borrowing the philosophy of emphasizing a product owner system and strengthening the synergy between product planning and manufacturing, rather than copying the complete system.
Image Source: Li Auto
Judging by the move to merge product lines, Li Auto is attempting to reduce internal competition and resource dispersion, concentrating limited management and R&D capabilities on more certain niche markets. This choice shares similarities with Toyota's approach of organizing by product groups and emphasizing overall product success, yet it retains Li Auto's own organizational characteristics and decision-making style.
The interviewed person stated: "A more core genetic difference lies in the underlying logic of corporate competitiveness."
Huawei centers on technology, Toyota on manufacturing, while Li Auto's core competitiveness lies in its precise insight into family user needs. To some extent, the success of the Li Auto ONE and the L series was essentially about understanding the core pain points of family users—"range anxiety, space needs, and smart interaction"—rather than relying solely on technological or manufacturing advantages.
Returning to Self: Li Auto Must Still "Be Itself"
By 2025, homogenized competition in the NEV industry had reached a white-hot stage. The extended-range electric vehicle (EREV) technology route, once popularized by Li Auto, attracted an influx of manufacturers like Leapmotor and XPENG. This led to a decline in the EREV market in 2025, as the "pain point bonus" of the past completely evaporated. According to data from the China Passenger Car Association (CPCA), EREV sales in July 2025 stood at 102,000 units, down 11.4% year-on-year. In contrast, pure electric vehicle sales surged by 24.5% over the same period, showing a clear divergence in market trends.
Against this industry backdrop, relying on the mere imitation of benchmark experience will only cause Li Auto to lose its core market identity.
The drastic change in the competitive environment directly diluted Li Auto's advantage in user mindshare. Brands like BYD and AITO quickly caught up in technology and product, launching multiple models targeting family users. Whether in space design or smart features, these overlap significantly with the Li Auto L series.
More critically, numerous startup automakers view Huawei and Toyota as learning benchmarks and blindly copy their processes and models, leading to an industry dilemma of "a thousand cars with the same face."
The common trap of benchmarking is gradually becoming apparent. While the experience of Huawei and Toyota can solve standardization issues in corporate development, it cannot support the building of differentiated competitiveness. For instance, the core logic of Toyota's lean production is "cost optimization centered on user needs," yet some automakers copy its production line layout while ignoring differences in their own user positioning. Similarly, the core of Huawei's IPD process is "gate control to ensure product reliability," but some brands have only replicated the form of "multi-stage reviews" without defining core gate indicators, resulting in core configurations lagging behind the market upon launch.
More importantly, user needs are upgrading. Family users' demands for vehicles have shifted from "basic comfort" to "personalized smart experiences." The mere combination of "fridge, color TV, and big sofa" has become an industry standard and can no longer form core competitiveness.
This requires Li Auto to innovate based on its own profound understanding of family users, rather than the simple transplantation of benchmark experience. If it remains stuck in imitating benchmarks, it will ultimately be swallowed by the wave of homogenization.
Li Auto's "journey to the West" ultimately points to the ultimate goal of "being itself." "Being oneself" does not negate past learning achievements; rather, it means anchoring its own core genes and transforming Huawei's organizational power and Toyota's manufacturing power into capabilities that serve its own development, thereby building a unique system that possesses both differentiation and competitiveness.
Industry insiders state: "Li Auto's success is essentially a 'success of user positioning.'"
Since its inception, it has focused on the niche group of family users, precisely capturing their core pain points. This is the core gene that distinguishes it from other startups. The primary prerequisite for "being oneself" is to strengthen this core advantage and transform the experience learned from Huawei and Toyota into the ability to serve family users.
Image Source: Li Auto's Weibo
Benchmark experience can solve "standardization" problems, but "differentiation" must rely on independent R&D. Li Auto knows well that to break out of homogeneous competition, it must establish its own technological moat—this is the core support for "being itself." After 2025, Li Auto significantly increased investment in proprietary R&D, focusing on breakthroughs in core areas while integrating benchmark technical logic to improve R&D efficiency and cost control capabilities.
According to a report by CCTV.com, Li Auto's 2025 quarterly financials show R&D investment reached 2.8 billion yuan in the second quarter, rising to 3 billion yuan in the third quarter. Full-year R&D expenses are expected to exceed 12 billion yuan. Several consecutive years of billion-level investments have driven the accelerated breakthrough of proprietary technologies.
In 2025, Li Auto's intelligent driving and smart cabin, built on proprietary AI large models, were comprehensively upgraded. In September of that year, Li Auto officially pushed the VLA driver model to AD Max users. The new intelligent driving system adopts a technical architecture closer to human intelligence, delivering a disruptive smart experience. At the same time, the voice assistant "Li Auto Classmate" was upgraded to the "Li Auto Classmate Agent." Based on three core capabilities—"autonomous tool use, completing complex tasks, and memory and understanding"—the agent will introduce the industry's first AI code generation tool, offering a personalized and diverse user experience.
In terms of electrification technology, Li Auto has mastered three core technologies: self-developed silicon carbide (SiC) power chips, self-developed and self-manufactured SiC power modules, and a new-generation electric drive assembly. These breakthrough electrification technologies are applied to the Li Auto i8 and subsequent pure electric products, helping to reduce electromagnetic noise in the drive system, improve dynamic performance, and increase vehicle space utilization. From power chips to drive assemblies, Li Auto has completed the industrial layout of electric drives, establishing core capabilities for future competition through end-to-end, full-link proprietary R&D and manufacturing while expanding industrial cooperation.
Conclusion: The "Coming of Age" for Startups
Li Auto's development path—from learning Huawei to showing Toyota traits, and then focusing on "being itself"—reflects the growth logic of Chinese startup automakers: in the early stages, borrowing from benchmarks to quickly plug gaps is a shortcut to scaled expansion; but when a company reaches a certain stage, it must anchor its core genes and engage in systematic innovation to gain a foothold in fierce market competition.
Currently, the NEV industry has entered a critical period of structural differentiation. The 600,000-unit mark has become the entry threshold for the first tier, while 400,000 units is the watershed for startups. For Li Auto, the sales volatility of 2025 was both a challenge and a "rite of passage"—it made Li Auto deeply realize that benchmark experience is a ladder, not the answer, and that "being yourself" is the core of building long-term competitiveness.
In the future, whether Li Auto can build differentiated barriers through proprietary R&D and systemic innovation while upholding its family-user positioning will directly determine its ultimate status in the industry. And its experience of the "journey to the West" and "self-awakening" will provide a reference for more startups: learning through imitation, breaking through through innovation, and ultimately finding one's own development path is the only way to navigate cycles and go steady and far in the wave of new energy vehicles.
