The year 2025 has etched a set of telling figures into the Chinese automotive landscape. Data compiled by Gasgoo Auto Research Institute shows that the market share of China branded passenger vehicles climbed to 68.5%, while joint ventures saw their share slip from a peak of 60-70% to around 30%. At the same time, complete vehicle exports surpassed 6 million units, cementing China's position as the world's largest auto exporter.
Beneath these contrasting figures lies a structural trend long underestimated: an increasing number of joint ventures in China are upgrading exports from a contingency measure to a strategic pillar.
In 2025, exports of foreign and joint venture brand passenger vehicles from China approached the 1 million mark. While not staggering, this figure marks a profound reconstruction of the role of JVs in China: shifting from a unidirectional localization of "in China, for China" to a bidirectional empowerment of "in China, for the world."
The Inevitability of Joint Ventures Going Global
The collective shift toward exports by joint ventures is driven by clear and realistic logic. Ye Sheng, a senior industry analyst, summed it up in an interview with Gasgoo as three main drivers: first, revitalizing existing capacity, turning assets that have lost in domestic competition into sought-after goods overseas; second, leveraging local manufacturing advantages to cover gaps abroad, using cost-effective Chinese platforms to serve markets like Latin America, the Middle East, and ASEAN; and third, upgrading from "market for technology" to the export of Chinese automotive infrastructure capabilities—no longer learning from foreign partners, but empowering the world in reverse.
Revitalizing existing capacity is the most direct practical need. As domestic competition turns white-hot, domestic brands continue to expand their share, leveraging their first-mover advantage in new energy and intelligence to squeeze the traditional territory of joint ventures. Against this backdrop, vast amounts of JV capacity sit idle or operate inefficiently. Rather than continuing to lose in the domestic grind, it makes more sense to reposition this capacity and seek a way out through overseas markets.
The Hyundai-Kia case is a typical embodiment of this logic. At their peak, the combined annual capacity of their joint ventures in China approached 3 million units. As market share continued to slide, this massive scale became a heavy burden. The corporate response was a selective contraction: while shutting down or converting some plants, they gradually transformed high-quality assets like Yueda Kia's Yancheng plant into global export bases. This contraction and expansion are two sides of the same strategy: contraction to curb losses, expansion to find new growth points.
Since launching its export business in 2018, Yueda Kia has built an export portfolio including models like the EV5 and Sportage, covering both internal combustion and pure electric powertrains, as well as segments like sedans and SUVs. Cumulative exports have now surpassed 500,000 vehicles. Yueda Kia's recent export performance fully demonstrates that capacity struggling to find use domestically can regain its value once connected with overseas demand.
Image Source: Kia
This is not a passive fire sale, but an active global reallocation of resources. The cost and efficiency advantages of manufacturing in China happen to fill the product gaps multinational automakers face in emerging markets. Regions like Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and South America still have low car ownership rates and maintain a steady demand for cost-effective vehicles. The completeness of China's auto supply chain and its cost control capabilities offer significant competitive advantages globally. Chinese plants of joint ventures can leverage local supply chains for low-cost production while utilizing the foreign partner's overseas channels and after-sales systems for sales—a kind of forced "win-win."
Sales data compiled by Gasgoo Auto Research Institute shows that for two consecutive years in 2024 and 2025, Yueda Kia's export sales exceeded 170,000 units. Beijing Hyundai's performance was also impressive, exporting over 50,000 units in 2024 and soaring 48.67% in 2025 to reach 82,000 units. These two Korean joint ventures have firmly secured the top three spots for export sales among foreign and joint venture brands in China, trailing only Tesla. Additionally, Volvo, Changan Ford, and SAIC-GM all recorded export sales exceeding 50,000 units in 2025.
Image Source: Hyundai Motor
Clearly, a growing number of joint ventures are transforming their Chinese factories from bases serving solely the local market into global export hubs.
A deeper change lies in the reverse export of capabilities. Ye Sheng points out that the business model of joint ventures in China is upgrading from the past forty years of "market for technology" to a comprehensive export of Chinese automotive infrastructure capabilities. This infrastructure refers not only to manufacturing capacity but also to the entire industrial ecosystem, including supply chain systems, product development capabilities, and electrification and intelligent technologies.
In the past, China introduced foreign technology, management, and brands through joint ventures. In this new stage, capabilities accumulated locally in China are beginning to feed back into global markets. When joint ventures export China-made models globally, they are essentially exporting the quality standards, technological content, and cost competitiveness of Chinese manufacturing to overseas markets. This meaning determines that the global expansion of joint ventures is not just a movement to absorb capacity, but a strategic transformation of capability export and role reshaping.
From short-term capacity digestion to medium-term utilization of cost advantages, and finally to long-term reverse export of technology and capabilities, these factors together form the deep-seated drivers for joint ventures going global. It is the combination of these drivers that makes exports no longer an optional backup for many joint ventures, but a strategic imperative for seeking new survival space amidst increasingly fierce competition.
The Realistic Path for Joint Ventures Going Global
Current practices show a diversification of paths, with Yueda Kia's export transformation serving as the most benchmark example. To date, Yueda Kia's cumulative exports have exceeded 500,000 units, covering regions including the Middle East, ASEAN, South America, and Australia. Behind this number lies the construction of a complete export system: from product adaptation, overseas certification, and logistics channel construction to overseas channel management and after-sales networks. Yueda Kia is not simply offloading unsold inventory overseas; instead, it makes customized adjustments to product configurations, emission standards, and even left- or right-hand drive for different target markets.
Hyundai Kia's other joint venture, Beijing Hyundai, is also advancing its export strategy. Although its Chongqing plant has been sold and its Shunyi Plant 1 transferred, remaining capacity is shifting toward exports. Beijing Hyundai's main target markets include Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and South America, with products focused primarily on compact sedans and SUVs.
Although both Korean joint ventures belong to the same group, their export strategies differ in focus: Yueda Kia started earlier, has wider coverage, and possesses a more mature system; Beijing Hyundai is in a catch-up phase but is accelerating its layout, leveraging the capital's locational advantages and richer management experience.
This path, dominated by traditional joint ventures and focused on complete vehicle exports, can be termed "capacity-repurposing globalization." Its characteristic is relying on existing capacity and brands to shift a portion or even the majority of output overseas by adjusting market positioning and sales channels. The advantage lies in a quick start, controllable risks, and no need for complex changes to equity or joint venture agreements. However, the challenges are equally obvious: whether the foreign headquarters' global channels are willing to open doors for China-made models, how Chinese and foreign sides distribute export profits, and whether export models will compete internally with products from other overseas bases—all these need to be properly resolved within the JV's governance framework.
Another path can be called "incremental cooperation globalization," exemplified by the partnership between Leapmotor and Stellantis. Previously, Stellantis acquired approximately 20% of Leapmotor and established a joint venture, Leapmotor International, with Stellantis leading the sales of Leapmotor brand models overseas. The uniqueness of this model lies in the fact that it is not a traditional joint venture going global; here, the Chinese side provides electrification platforms and intelligent driving technology, while the foreign side offers overseas channels, brand backing, and after-sales networks, jointly promoting "Chinese technology plus Chinese manufacturing" models to the world.
Image Source: Stellantis
The deep significance of this path lies in breaking the traditional role definitions of technology provider and market provider within joint ventures. For the past forty years, the core logic of JVs was that the foreign side provided technology, brand, and management, while the Chinese side provided market, land, and labor. However, in the fields of electrification and intelligence, China's technological accumulation and supply chain advantages have surpassed those of most multinational automakers. Leapmotor's LEAP 3.0 architecture, CTC battery-chassis integration technology, and eight-in-one electric drive system are competitive globally. Stellantis' choice to invest in Leapmotor and sell its products overseas is essentially a reverse procurement of Chinese electrification technology, opening a brand new door for joint ventures going global.
In addition, some "revitalized joint venture brands" are also pushing into export business, represented by smart and Spotlight Automotive. smart was originally a micro-car brand under Mercedes-Benz. After establishing a joint venture with Geely, it fully shifted to electrification, with Geely responsible for engineering development and manufacturing. The new generation of smart models is produced at the Xi'an plant for global sales, with Europe as a key target. Spotlight Automotive is a joint venture project between Great Wall Motor and BMW, producing electric models under the MINI brand, also facing the global market.
Image Source: smart
The characteristic of this model is that the joint venture itself is established for the global market, rather than shifting from serving the domestic market to exporting. Its products consider global regulations and market demands from the R&D stage, with clear brand ownership and clear division of labor in channels. The Chinese and foreign sides have formed a more balanced cooperative relationship across technology, manufacturing, and market dimensions.
There is no superiority or inferiority among these paths; the key to success lies in whether joint ventures can shift from a single positioning of "in China, for China" to a diversified layout of "in China, for the world." This requires the Chinese and foreign sides to reach a new consensus on strategic goals, profit distribution, and resource investment.
The "double helix" path proposed by Ye Sheng in an interview summarizes this trend. The so-called double helix refers to the foreign side utilizing its overseas channel capabilities and brand influence, while the Chinese side utilizes its electrification and intelligent technology and efficient production capabilities. The two chains intertwine and empower each other, jointly building a new system of Chinese manufacturing with global coverage. This is no longer a zero-sum game, but a deep coupling based on respective comparative advantages. The foreign side does not need to continue investing huge sums of money in price wars in China's "red ocean," but can position Chinese factories as export bases for emerging markets; the Chinese side does not need to build overseas channels and brand awareness from scratch, but can leverage the foreign side's global network to quickly achieve product exports.
If this coupling operates smoothly, it will release energy far exceeding that of each party acting independently.
The Future Landscape of Joint Ventures Going Global
Looking ahead, the trend of joint ventures going global will deepen, though its form and logic may evolve. The most core change may be that the shift will upgrade from simple capacity transfer and vehicle exports to a systematic export of capabilities. This includes not only product exports but also the global diffusion of manufacturing standards, supply chain management, quality systems, and even concepts of new energy infrastructure. Chinese joint venture plants will no longer be low-cost assembly workshops in the global system of multinationals, but will become product definition centers, engineering development centers, and quality standard centers for emerging markets.
China's automotive supply chain integration capability is already leading globally. From batteries, motors, and electronic controls to smart cockpits and autonomous driving chips, the completeness, response speed, and cost control capabilities of China's core component supply system in new energy and intelligent connectivity fields have surpassed those of Europe, Japan, and South Korea. If multinational automakers want to maintain global competitiveness in the electrification era, they must deeply integrate into China's supply chain system. The export business of joint ventures is precisely the best interface for this integration—by producing global-facing models in Chinese plants, multinationals can maximize the advantages of China's supply chain.
At the same time, user demand and product iteration speeds in the Chinese market are defining global trends. In the past, the development cycle for global auto products was typically five to seven years, while the iteration cycle in China has shortened to one to two years. This means that product definitions and feature configurations verified in the Chinese market may only become standard in other markets two or three years later. By exporting models produced in Chinese factories overseas, joint ventures are essentially engaging in "time arbitrage"—exporting products and technologies that have matured in China to markets that are still in earlier stages.
Global trade patterns and geopolitical factors are also reshaping the regional division of labor in the auto industry. China-US trade frictions, anti-subsidy investigations into Chinese EVs by multiple countries, and protectionist policies for local manufacturing are all pushing multinationals to reconfigure their global capacity. Against this backdrop, Chinese plants of joint ventures need to find their new positioning. For products targeting the US market, Chinese plants may not be the optimal choice; but for products targeting ASEAN, the Middle East, Latin America, Africa, and parts of Europe, Chinese plants still hold irreplaceable cost and efficiency advantages. The export strategies of joint ventures must be deeply aligned with the global capacity layout and trade compliance strategies of multinationals.
Of course, the road for joint ventures going global is not without obstacles. The first deep challenge comes from profit distribution and interest coordination between Chinese and foreign sides. The profit pool involved in export business is more complex than domestic sales: the Chinese side hopes export business can maximize the sharing of fixed costs, increase capacity utilization, and create new profit sources; the foreign side needs to consider whether export models will impact its production bases and market systems in other regions. Designing transfer pricing mechanisms, dividing regional markets, and coordinating the production division of labor among bases all require delicate maneuvering within the JV's governance framework.
Another important challenge comes from entry barriers and compliance risks in overseas markets. Different countries and regions have vastly different access standards, emission regulations, safety certifications, and tariff policies for auto products. If joint ventures want to cover the global market, it means dealing with more than 100 different regulatory systems and certification processes, requiring significant investment of time, capital, and professional talent. Additionally, some countries are setting higher trade barriers against Chinese-made cars. The export strategies of joint ventures must possess sufficient flexibility and risk hedging capabilities, avoiding putting all eggs in one basket.
Complete vehicle export is only the first step. Subsequent parts supply, maintenance and repair, customer complaint handling, and recall management are also key to determining whether a brand can establish a long-term foothold overseas. In the past, the after-sales service of joint ventures relied mainly on domestic 4S dealership networks. After exporting to overseas markets, they need to rely on the global dealer networks of the foreign parent company. However, it remains uncertain whether the foreign parent's dealers are willing to invest resources to sell and maintain a "Made in China" model, or whether they can provide service quality equivalent to that in China.
It must also be said that joint ventures going global have to face the competitive squeeze from domestic brands going global. Currently, mainstream domestic brands are also accelerating global expansion. Chinese local automakers like BYD, Chery, Great Wall Motor, Geely, and SAIC have established sales networks and brand influence of considerable scale in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and Europe. In the eyes of overseas consumers, the "Made in China" label is shifting from cheap and low-quality to cost-effective. However, in this process of cognitive transformation, the boundary between domestic brands and joint venture brands is not clear. If the products exported by joint ventures cannot differentiate in price from domestic brands, and cannot obtain strong support from the foreign parent in terms of brand, they can easily fall into the awkward predicament of "falling between two stools."
Of course, despite the heavy challenges, the strategic direction of joint ventures going global appears irreversible now. In the coming years, the market share of domestic new energy and domestic brands will likely continue to climb, meaning the space for joint ventures in the domestic market may be further compressed. If they do not find growth in exports, most joint ventures will face the fate of continuously declining capacity utilization, operating losses, and eventually being forced to exit the Chinese market. Export transformation provides them with a decent and sustainable way out—not being eliminated as losers, but being reintegrated as participants in global resource allocation.
From a more macro perspective, the rise of joint ventures going global marks the historic leap of the Chinese auto industry from "market for technology" to "technology for market." Forty years ago, China opened its auto market and allowed multinationals to enter in the form of joint ventures, with the core appeal of using the market to exchange for foreign technology and management experience. Forty years later, China has not only built the world's most complete auto industrial system but has also formed the ability for reverse export in electrification and intelligence. Joint ventures are no longer merely platforms for technology input, but are becoming nodes for technology and capability output.
The significance of this transformation goes far beyond the auto industry itself, implying that the competitiveness of Chinese manufacturing has upgraded from cost advantage to systemic advantage—including supply chain integration capability, product iteration speed, digital experience, and the organizational capability of large-scale complex manufacturing. The global expansion of joint ventures is essentially the global diffusion of this set of systemic advantages. When cars made in China, wearing the badges of Hyundai, Kia, smart, and MINI, drive on the streets of Riyadh, Jakarta, Sao Paulo, and Sydney, the world sees not just a car, but a concentrated projection of a country's industrial capability.
Summary:
The future of joint ventures does not lie in guarding their small plot of the Chinese market, nor in simply transferring excess capacity overseas, but in deeply embedding into the global value chain of multinationals and becoming an indispensable strategic node within it.
This requires both Chinese and foreign sides to transcend zero-sum thinking and truly establish a long-term cooperation framework based on complementary advantages. It also requires the management teams of joint ventures to possess global vision and strategic resolve, making systematic arrangements in capacity adjustment, product planning, channel construction, and compliance management. This road will not be flat, but it is one of the few directions with strategic certainty for joint ventures as the Chinese market enters an era of stock competition.
