The Reverse Joint Venture Wave Returns

Gasgoo Munich-By mid-May 2026, Dongfeng and Stellantis had signed a memorandum of understanding to form a joint venture in Europe, as six parties—including Dongfeng—injected 8 billion yuan into Dongfeng Peugeot-Citroën. Separately, reports suggest Huawei and JAC are in talks with Maserati over a "same car, dual badges" collaboration, though none have confirmed this. Earlier, in late March, Chery and Jaguar Land Rover officially launched the "FREELANDER" brand, marking a shift where the Chinese side leads product definition and operations while the foreign partner provides support.

In just the first five months of 2026, three landmark "reverse" deals have taken shape. Their common thread: Chinese automakers are no longer mere technology licensors; they are integrating partners' factories, production capacity, and even operational control over luxury brands. The role of Chinese companies is being rewritten, shifting from "trading market access for technology" to "trading technology for capacity and branding."

2026 Reverse JVs: What is Chinese Tech "Buying"?

On May 15, Dongfeng Motor, Stellantis, and industrial capital from Hubei and Wuhan signed a strategic agreement to inject over 8 billion yuan into Dongfeng Peugeot-Citroën. Stellantis contributed roughly 130 million euros to fully support the joint venture's transition toward electrification, intelligence, and globalization.

Image: Dongfeng Peugeot-Citroën

Under the agreement, starting in 2027, the Wuhan plant will begin producing two Jeep-branded new-energy off-road models. These will be sold globally via Stellantis's distribution network. The plan also includes launching new-energy models for the Peugeot brand, building a "made-in-China, for-the-world" production and export system.

Just five days later, Dongfeng and Stellantis signed a non-binding memorandum of understanding to establish a joint venture in Europe. This entity will handle sales and distribution of Voyah automobiles in designated markets. The partners are also preliminarily discussing local production of Dongfeng's new-energy models at Stellantis's Rennes plant in France.

Additionally, reports indicate Dongfeng is reverse-licensing technology platforms from its Voyah and Mhero brands to Stellantis for the development of Jeep's rugged off-road vehicles.

Founded in 1992, Dongfeng Peugeot-Citroën peaked at 711,000 sales in 2015. However, as the market share of joint ventures slid from 51% in 2020 to 24% in 2025, the company has faced long-term operational headwinds. The 8 billion yuan injection represents more than a rescue; it is an exploration of an entirely new cooperation paradigm.

Notably, such partnerships face structural market ceilings. Analysts at Gasgoo Automotive Research Institute note that joint ventures are under severe survival pressure in China, forecasting their share of the passenger car market to shrink to around 20% by 2030. Exports, therefore, are likely the breakthrough point for these projects.

Unlike the concrete investment and agreements between Dongfeng and Stellantis, cooperation among Huawei, JAC, and Maserati remains in the rumor stage, with no official confirmation from any party. Gasgoo reached out to the Harmony Intelligent Mobility Alliance for comment, but received no response as of press time.

Image: Zunjie Auto

Reports suggest Huawei, JAC, and Maserati are negotiating to build Maserati-branded new-energy vehicles. The model mirrors the "Five Realms" framework of the Harmony Intelligent Mobility Alliance: Huawei leads product definition and supplies full-stack technology, JAC handles R&D and manufacturing, and Maserati provides design and brand endorsement. The strategy involves "same car, dual badges"—sold under the Zunjie brand in China and wearing the Maserati badge abroad. The first model is currently in the design phase, with mass production slated for the second half of 2027.

This collaboration comes against a bleak backdrop for Maserati. In 2025, global sales totaled roughly 7,900 units—a 30% year-on-year drop and a decline of over 70% compared to 2023, marking a ten-year low. In China, sales plummeted by more than 90%. Parent company Stellantis reported a net loss of 22.3 billion euros for 2025, its first annual loss since its formation in 2021.

While no formal agreement has been signed, reports suggest relevant R&D work is already underway.

"Reverse" cooperation is also taking substantive shape between Chery and Jaguar Land Rover. Two months before the Huawei rumors surfaced, the partners had already launched a tangible new brand.

On March 31, Chery and Jaguar Land Rover unveiled the new "FREELANDER" brand. The Freelander nameplate, a former Land Rover classic that topped European SUV sales charts for five consecutive years from 1997 to 2002, has been upgraded to an independent brand. The plan calls for six models in five years, with the first launching in China in the second half of 2026. The brand has established a global operations system comprising a Shanghai headquarters, the Gaydon Global Design Center in the UK, a Suzhou research institute, and a Changshu manufacturing base.

In the division of labor, the Chinese side leads product definition, technical development, and supply chain management, while Jaguar Land Rover handles brand positioning, design, and global markets.

The FREELANDER brand also debuted its iMAX intelligent electric architecture, supporting pure electric, extended-range, and plug-in hybrid powertrains. The launch model for China will feature a standard 800V extended-range platform, equipped with Huawei's Qiankun ADS 5.0 autonomous driving system and batteries developed in partnership with CATL.

From technical R&D and supply chain integration to brand operations and channel construction, Chery has secured full-chain decision-making power—from product definition to final delivery—in this project.

The boundaries of reverse joint ventures are widening. Beyond deep ties in products, brands, and technology, Chinese automakers are beginning to secure overseas factory resources, upgrading cooperation from "channel borrowing" to "capacity control."

On May 8, Stellantis opened two Spanish plants to Leapmotor, including the potential partial transfer of ownership of the Madrid factory to the joint venture. This marks the first time a global mainstream automaker has transferred European factory ownership to a Chinese partner. Leapmotor had already established over 850 sales outlets in Europe via Stellantis's channels, with shipments exceeding 40,000 vehicles in 2025 and seeing overseas sales jump 726.5% year-on-year in 2026. This capacity cooperation signals that Leapmotor's technology solutions are becoming further embedded in Stellantis's European manufacturing system.

Meanwhile, BYD, Geely, and GAC have made the shortlist for the final bid for Nissan's COMPAS plant in Mexico. With an annual capacity of 230,000 units, it is a prime example of "plug-and-play" capacity. The bid comes as Mexico prepares to impose a 50% tariff on imports from non-free-trade-agreement countries starting in 2026. COMPAS's North American production eligibility satisfies USMCA rules of origin, allowing tariff-free circulation between the U.S. and Mexico—a crucial move for Chinese automakers to maintain access to the North American market.

These cases point to a clear trend: cooperation between Chinese and multinational automakers is upgrading from "technology licensing" to "capacity integration plus brand co-management." Chinese companies' voice is evolving from a passive minority stakeholder to the dominant controller in certain projects.

What Benchmarks Have XPENG and Leapmotor Set?

Cooperation models between Chinese and multinational automakers took on new characteristics in 2026, extending from technology licensing to capacity integration and brand co-management. To understand this shift, we must look back to two landmark "reverse" joint venture cases from 2023.

Image: XPENG Motors

In July 2023, Volkswagen invested approximately $700 million in XPENG for a 4.99% stake. The two subsequently co-developed the CEA electronic and electrical architecture. By January 2026, the first model featuring this architecture, the "U07," rolled off the production line. In March, their first jointly developed full-size electric SUV, the "U08," went into production at Volkswagen Anhui.

The partnership has delivered significant economic returns for XPENG. According to XPENG's financial reports, full-year "service and other revenue" reached 8.34 billion yuan in 2025, a 65.6% increase, with a profit margin as high as 68.2% to 70.8%. Fourth-quarter revenue alone hit 3.18 billion yuan, up 121.9% year-on-year, helping XPENG achieve its first positive net profit of 380 million yuan in that quarter. In the first quarter of 2026, "service and other revenue" stood at 2.03 billion yuan, a 41.2% rise, while the company's overall gross margin held steady at a high industry level of 20.6%.

In October 2023, Stellantis invested 1.5 billion euros to acquire roughly 21% of Leapmotor, forming a joint venture, Leapmotor International, with a 51:49 split controlled by Stellantis. Over the past two years, Leapmotor has established over 850 sales and service outlets in Europe via Stellantis. It recorded shipments of over 40,000 vehicles to Europe in 2025, and first-quarter 2026 overseas exports reached 40,901 units, a massive 442% year-on-year increase.

The XPENG-Volkswagen and Leapmotor-Stellantis deals both validate a key reality: global top-tier automakers are willing to pay for Chinese technology. The "technology plus equity plus channel" light-asset export model is viable. Multinational corporations have shifted from "examining Chinese technology" to "actively seeking it out."

Yet the limitations are clear. In Leapmotor International, Stellantis holds the majority stake, leaving the Chinese side with limited actual say over overseas pricing and channel management. XPENG's technical cooperation with Volkswagen is primarily focused on the Chinese market; while the tie-up boosts XPENG's recognition in Europe to some extent, it does little to elevate its own brand power there.

The early cooperation between XPENG and Volkswagen, and Leapmotor and Stellantis, provided valuable lessons for the new "reverse" deals of 2026. In the Dongfeng-Stellantis partnership, discussions about using Stellantis's existing Spanish plants for local production began early, aiming to bypass tariff barriers by placing capacity directly in Europe. The Huawei-JAC-Maserati collaboration uses a "dual badge" strategy, preserving the independent status of the Chinese brand "Zunjie." Chery, meanwhile, achieved full-chain Chinese leadership in the FREELANDER project.

From 2023 to 2026, the form of reverse joint ventures has evolved. Early deals focused on technology licensing and equity investment, with Chinese firms acting primarily as technology suppliers. The new cases of 2026 see Chinese automakers embedding their technology directly into partners' manufacturing systems, deploying overseas capacity, retaining their own brands, and leading product definition with full-stack technology. This represents not just deeper cooperation, but a shift in the power structure.

Why the Acceleration, and What Are the Challenges?

The flurry of reverse joint venture deals in the first five months of 2026 is no accident. At least three factors are driving this trend.

First, trade barriers are forcing local production. In 2025, the EU imposed anti-subsidy tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, pushing combined rates close to 45%. In January 2026, after multiple rounds of talks, China and the EU reached a framework consensus to replace these tariffs with a "price undertaking" mechanism. The core requirement is that Chinese automakers voluntarily raise export prices to Europe to no lower than local equivalents, in exchange for tariff exemptions.

Then, in May 2026, the European Commission released the "Industrial Accelerator Act" legislative proposal, imposing foreign investment restrictions on four sectors, including batteries and electric vehicles. Conditions include limiting foreign shareholding to under 49%, mandatory technology transfer, and a local workforce ratio of no less than 50%.

Second, excess capacity in Europe needs revitalizing. Data from the European Automobile Manufacturers Association shows annual production fell from roughly 16 million units in 2018 to 11.4 million in 2024. Stellantis's Zaragoza plant produced only about 300,000 units in 2025, far below the 2019 peak of 470,000, with capacity utilization at just 50%. For groups like Stellantis, closing plants faces immense union pressure and political costs. Bringing in Chinese partners to utilize idle capacity has become a pragmatic and economic choice.

Image: Leapmotor Motors

Third, Chinese technology now commands a premium. Leapmotor's export volume surged 442% year-on-year in 2026, with its share of Italy's pure electric market hitting 33.5% at one point. The performance of the Zunjie S800 in the million-yuan sedan market further validates the premium potential of Chinese technology and manufacturing. In this context, reverse joint ventures are becoming an irreversible trend in the globalization of Chinese automakers.

Analysts at Gasgoo Automotive Research Institute believe the excess capacity in Europe and the spillover of Chinese technology have created a supply-demand match, making this trend sustainable. Future cases will likely see more Chinese leadership, particularly in technology and product definition. However, ownership remains restricted by EU regulations, such as the 49% foreign cap in the Industrial Accelerator Act. As one analyst put it: "This shift means Chinese automakers have made a breakthrough in technological influence, but building global brand premium and channel control still takes time."

Yet, reverse joint ventures are not a smooth path; there are significant hidden concerns.

In the Dongfeng-Stellantis European joint venture, Stellantis holds 51% and leads sales and service channels. This ownership structure mirrors that of Leapmotor International. Under such arrangements, the Chinese side's actual voice over overseas pricing, channel management, and brand operations is constrained.

Secondly, in technical cooperation, Chinese firms share full-stack architectures with multinationals. Partners may gradually accumulate their own R&D capabilities during the process. Once technology licensing agreements expire, Chinese automakers must plan how to handle potential technological countermeasures and competitive relationships.

Gasgoo analysts note that while the risk of knowledge spillover and intensified competition exists, the real test now is the ability to iterate continuously. Engineering capability, defined by iteration speed and industrialization efficiency, is the true barrier. Chinese automakers must clarify IP ownership and the distribution of subsequent iteration results, while accelerating next-generation R&D to maintain a generational advantage and strengthen their competitiveness.

Finally, geopolitical risk remains a variable hanging over the globalization of Chinese automakers. Fluctuating trade barriers, tightening investment reviews, and the protectionist tendencies of overseas markets toward local supply chains could all impact the pace of reverse joint ventures.

Conclusion:

From the first reverse joint venture deal in 2023 to the deepening cooperation models in 2026, the Chinese auto industry has turned "reverse JVs" from isolated cases into an industry phenomenon in less than three years. XPENG and Leapmotor have accumulated valuable experience for subsequent collaborations—and drawn the necessary boundaries.

Today, Dongfeng, Huawei, Chery, and others are continuing to explore this path. European factories, luxury brands, and a seat at the table where rules are defined have all become topics on the negotiation agenda.